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Abstract—This paper deals with the detection of flooding
attacks which are the most common type of Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks. We compare 2 divergence measures (Hellinger
distance and Chi-square divergence) to analyze their detection
accuracy. The performance of these statistical divergence mea-
sures are investigated in terms of true positive and false alarm
ratio. A particular focus will be on how to use these measures
over Sketch data structure, and which measure provides the
best detection accuracy. We conduct performance analysis over
publicly available real IP traces (MAWI) collected from the
WIDE backbone network. Our experimental results show that
Chi-square divergence outperforms Hellinger distance in network
anomalies detection.
Keyword: DDoS, TCP SYN Flooding, K-ary Sketch, Hellinger
Distance, Chi-Square Divergence.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security issues have been widely investigated in the last
decade. Recently, many web servers were victim of flooding
attacks over the Internet. In this paper, we focus on istributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks through TCP SYN flooding,
since most of web servers use TCP protocol, and SYN flooding
is the most commonly used attack [1], [2], [3]. Recently,
PayPal was victim of SYN flooding attack and its services
had been interrupted for a duration of 8 hours and 15 minutes
on December 2010.
Many change point detection algorithms aggregate the
whole network traffic in one flow, and identify the instant
where deviation occurs in the resulted time series. However, as
these methods aggregate the whole traffic in one time series,
low intensity attacks are buried by the large variations of
background traffic in high speed networks, and attacks may
pass undetected. Moreover, the time series derived from IP
traffic are subject to many variations that are irrelevant to
anomaly. The time series are non-stationary and tend to change
over time, leading to a lot of false alarms. Reducing the false
alarms and increasing the detection accuracy in such methods
is a challenging problem.
In this paper, we compare 2 divergence measures for the
detection of flooding attacks. These measures describe the de-
viation between two probability distributions. They are applied
over Sketch data structure to accomplish a grained analysis
for flooding attack detection. The Sketch data structure is
used for dimensionality reduction, and to derive probabil-
ity distributions. We emphasize our study in this paper on
the comparison of these divergences measures with dynamic
threshold. The objective is to pinpoint the divergence measure
with the highest detection rate and the lowest false alarm
rate. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no prior
attempts to compare the performance of divergence measures
over Sketch.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work
is provided in section II. Section III describes briefly the
Sketch data structure and presents a short description of used
divergence measures in our comparison. Section IV describes
the implemented system used to achieve comparison between
divergence measures. Section V presents our experimental
results over real IP traces. Finally, we present the conclusion
and our future work in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
SYN flooding attack detection has been an interesting
issue for security researchers. Proposed methods for network
anomaly detection are based on different techniques, such
as Haar-wavelet analysis [4], [5], entropy based method [6]
and Holt-Winters [7] seasonal forecasting method. Authors
in [3] compare two different algorithms (CUSUM and adaptive
threshold) for the detection of SYN flooding attack. They con-
clude that CUSUM performs better than adaptive threshold in
terms of detection accuracy of low intensity attacks. However,
both of these algorithms face problems of false alarm ratio
under normal IP traffic variations.
Most of existing works for flooding attack detection ag-
gregate the whole traffic in one time series, and applies
a change point detection algorithm to detect the instant of
anomaly occurrence. They have a good performance in terms
of spatial and temporal complexity, but present the drawback
of aggregating all traffic in one flow, where low intensity
attacks cannot be detected and normal traffic variations raise
false alarms.
In response to these problems, Sketch data structure uses
random aggregation for more grained analysis than aggre-
gating whole traffic in one flow. It has been used to sum-
marize monitored traffic in a fixed memory, and to provide
scalable input for time series analysis. Authors in [8], [9]
apply Hellinger Distance (HD) over Sketch data structure, in
order to detect heavy deviations between current and previous
distributions of the number of SIP INVITE requests. In fact,
HD increases up to one whenever the distributions diverge
(e.g. under INVITE flooding attacks). In addition, they used a
dynamic threshold mechanism (proposed in [9]) during their
experimental analysis for anomaly detection.
In this paper, we also use Sketch data structure to provide
grained analysis and to derive probability distributions. We are
aiming to compare the performance of 2 divergence measures:
Hellinger Distance and Chi-square divergence.
III. BACKGROUND
A. K-ary Sketch
Using Sketch data structure makes our framework flexible
and scalable for grained analysis. No matter how many flows
exist in the traffic, Sketch generates fixed-number of time
series [10], [11] for anomaly detection. Sketch provides more
grained analysis than aggregating whole traffic in one time
series.
The Sketch data structure is used for dimensionality reduc-
tion. It is based on random aggregation of traffic attribute (e.g.
number of packets) in different hash tables. A Sketch S is a
2D array of H × K cell (as shown in Fig. 1), where K is
the size of the hash table, and H is the number of mutual
independent hash functions (universal hash functions). Each
item is identified by a key κn and associated with a reward
value νn. For each new arriving item (κn, νn), the associated
value will be added to the cell S[i][j], where i is an index
used to represent the hash function associated with ith hash
table (0 ≤ i ≤ d − 1), and j is the hash value (j = hi(κn))
of the key by the ith hash function.
Data items whose keys are hashed to the same value, will
be aggregated in the same cell in the hash table, and their
values will be added up to existing counter in the hash table.
Each hash table (or each row) is used to derive probability
distribution as the ratio of the counter in each cell to the sum
of whole cell in the line. The derived probability distributions
(we get K probability set, one per line) are used as inputs for
divergence measures.
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Fig. 1. Sketch data structure.
B. Divergence measures
These measures are used to detect the DDoS attacks based
on the deviation of traffic distribution. In fact, the idea is to
compare the prior distribution derived from Sketch counters
in previous time slot, with the currently obtained distribution.
One can use this change to detect flooding attack, because the
counter of one cell will increase significantly with the number
of sent requests, and the probability distribution deviates at
the start and stop instants of the flooding attack.
1) Hellinger Distance (HD): is used to measure the di-
vergence between two sets of probability values. For two
discrete probability distributions P = (p0, p1, . . . , pk−1) and
Q = (q0, q1, . . . , qK−1), with pi ≥ 0, qi ≥ 0, and:
K−1∑
i=0
pi =
K−1∑
i=0
qi = 1 (1)
The HD [8] between current distribution P and prior distribu-
tion Q is defined as:
HD(P,Q) =
1
2
K−1∑
ı=0
(
√
p
i
−√q
i
)2 (2)
Where HD satisfies the inequality 0 ≤ HD(P,Q) ≤ 1, and
HD(P,Q) = 0 iff P = Q. HD is a symmetric distance (e.g.
HD(P,Q) = HD(Q,P )), and induces two spikes, one at the
beginning of change, and the second at the end of the change.
2) Chi-square Divergence: χ2 divergence [12] between 2
probability distributions P and Q is given by:
χ2 (P ||Q) =
K−1∑
i=0
(pi − qi)2
qi
(3)
Where Q is the prior probability distribution, and P is the
current probability distribution, and χ2(P,Q) is the divergence
between distributions P and Q.
χ2 divergence can run from zero into infinity. χ2 will be
zero iff P and Q are identical (pi = qi) and χ2 increases
as the distributions become dissimilar, and eventually so high
(infinity) when the two distributions are independent (P 6= Q).
It is important to note that χ2 divergence is asymmetric, where
it generates only one spike at the beginning of the attack. The
division 0/0 in Eq. 3 is treated as 0, and the division by zero
is replaced by a very small value ε.
The χ2 divergence between 2 probability distributions P
and Q must be near zero under normal traffic, with a large
deviation (one spike) when distributions change occurs.
IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
To compare divergence measures, we use K-ary Sketch to
derive probability distributions. First, the time is divided into
discrete interval T (e.g. T = 1 min). During each interval,
the destination IP address (DIP), for each packet containing a
SYN segment, is hashed by H hash functions. The resulted
hash value by the ith function (j = hi(DIP )) is used as index
of the associated counter Si,j with DIP . In fact, the counter is
shared with random destination addresses, because many DIP
may have the same hash value, and share the same counter.
Each arriving SYN segment increments the associated counter.
For the sake of simplicity, we will restrict our analysis to TCP
SYN flooding by counting only the number of SYN, as many
web services are based on TCP, and SYN flooding is the most
used flooding attacks in these days. However, this approach
can be used to detect flooding with any protocols (TCP, UDP,
ICMP, etc.).
At the end of each epoch T , we derive probability distri-
butions from Sketch. First, we get the sum of the counter in
each line, and the probability pi,j in each cell is calculated as
the ratio of each counter to the total number of SYN:
pi,j = Si,j .Counter/
K−1∑
j=0
Si,j .Counter (4)
Each cell Si,j becomes a data structure, that contains: current
counter, current and previous probabilities. Therefore, each
line (or hash table) provides two probability distributions:
the first one is from previous interval and used as reference
distribution Qi. The second one is from current interval Pi, and
used to measure the divergence from the reference distribution,
in order to detect anomalies. Divergence measures between
the current (Pi) and reference probability (Qi) distributions
is calculated for each line in the Sketch, at the end of each
time interval (i.e. at n.T ). During malicious activities, the
divergence measure D(Pi||Qi) produces spikes, and when
more than L (L < H) divergences resulted from different
hash tables exceed a dynamic threshold, an alarm is raised.
To detect deviations in the time series resulted from diver-
gence measures, we derive a subsequent time series containing
the values of D(Pi||Qi) without spikes. In this last time series
(without large values), we define a dynamic bound of µi+ασi.
Significant deviations are larger than the dynamic bound:
D(Pi||Qi) > µi + ασi (5)
Where D(Pi||Qi) is the divergence measure in the time
interval n.T for the ith line in the Sketch, and µi & σi are
the mean and the standard deviation respectively of smoothed
time series that doesn’t contain spikes (Dˆ(Pi||Qi)). µi and
σi are updated dynamically using the Exponentially Weighted
Moving Average (EWMA):
µi = βµi−1 + (1− β)Dˆ(Pi||Qi) (6)
σ2i = βσ
2
i−1 + (1− β)(Dˆ(Pi||Qi)− µi)2 (7)
The threshold is updated dynamically with the value of µi
and σi as shown in equations 6 & 7. α is a parameter used
for calibrating the sensitivity of the detection algorithm to
variations. It is also used to reduce the false alarm rate. Under
normal traffic, divergence D(Pi||Qi) falls inside the bound of
µi + 2σi. When D(Pi||Qi) exceeds the dynamically updated
threshold over L lines, an alarm is triggered. Other interesting
approaches for estimating and adjusting dynamic threshold
were proposed in [9], [8] for SIP INVITE flooding detection.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the performance analysis results
for integrating divergence measures over Sketch, for detecting
SYN flooding attacks. As we want to compare 2 divergence
measures (HD & χ2) over Sketch for the detection of flooding
attacks, we use real IP traces from MAWI [13] traffic reposi-
tory. For the sake of simplicity, we focus our analysis on the
detection of TCP SYN flooding attacks, as it is the widely
used attack for DDoS in these days.
A. Dataset
We use the daily traces from samplepoint-F, collected on
trans-Pacific line (150 Mbps) from 15/04/2010 07h30 to 16h00
as few hours in the life of the internet between Japan &
USA. These traces are used to test the efficiency of divergence
measures. IP addresses in the traces are scrambled by a
modified version of tcpdriv [13] tool, but correlation between
addresses are conserved. We analyze these 8h30 of wide area
network traces using Sketch data structure, with a key of the
Sketch (κn = DIP ), and a reward vn = 1 for SYN request
only, and vn = 0 otherwise. We set the Sketch width K to
1024, and the number of hash H to 5.
Afterward, we inject 12 real distributed SYN flooding
attacks with different intensity inside this trace. These attacks
are inserted each 30 minutes (on instants t=31, 71, 111, 127,
etc.) and span for 10 minutes. These different intensity attacks
are shown in Fig. 2. The first attack begins with a value
of 10000 SYN/min and decreases exponentially until 3200
SYN/min.
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Fig. 2. SYN flooding Attacks.
Fig. 3 & Fig. 6 show the variation of number of SYN before
and after the injection of SYN flooding attacks. By comparing
these variations, we might not notice the differences between
both figures without deep inspection. Inserted attacks don’t
induce heavy deviations in the time series of the total number
of SYN requests. Thus can be explained by the fact that the
intensity of SYN flooding attacks is not large compared to the
intensity of the total number of SYN segments. In such cases,
the detection of attacks is very challenging, because no heavy
changes in the time series describing the variations of the total
number of SYN, and the intensity of the SYN flooding attacks
is buried by the large number of SYN (as shown in Fig. 3)
before attacks injection.
B. Evaluation strategy
In this section, we present the evaluation results of the
application of these divergence measures on the IP traces.
First, we begin our analysis by applying HD & χ2 divergence
over the traces (before attacks injection). We set the dynamic
threshold as given in Eq. 5. For the sake of clarity, we present
the results over the first line of Sketch, where other lines
exhibit similar variations.
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Fig. 3. Total number of SYN.
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Fig. 4. Hellinger Distance before attacks.
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Fig. 5. Chi-square before attacks.
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Fig. 6. Total number of SYN after attacks.
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Fig. 7. Hellinger Distance after attacks.
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Fig. 8. Chi-square after attacks.
Destination IP address Destination port
210.175.130.64 XX
211.174.112.130 110
211.174.112.135 110
211.174.110.34 110
211.174.110.53 110
211.174.88.200 110
202.68.36.5 443
TABLE I
VICTIM SERVERS.
Fig. 4 & Fig. 5 show the variations of HD and Chi-square
divergence, as well as the dynamic threshold (dashed line)
before the injection of attacks. When the value of divergence
measures is larger than threshold in at least 3 hash tables in the
Sketch, an alarm is triggered. Therefore, we found that both
measures detect anomalies at different instants (t=56, 111, 127,
etc.). We verify these instants, and we found many existing
anomalies (PortScan, flooding, NetScan). The IP addresses of
victim servers and the destination port (unless for PortScan)
are given in table I. XX is used to represent many ports. In
fact, all these anomalies don’t span for more than few minutes.
However, there are more anomalies that can be detected by
using the source IP address as the key of the Sketch, but we
will restrict our analysis to SYN flooding attacks. In fact, after
the manual verification of traces, we found that HD triggers
4 false alarms, and the χ2 divergence achieves very high
detection accuracy with 1 false alarm.
Afterward, we inject the SYN flooding attacks given in
Fig. 2 over the analyzed traces. We conduct the same analysis
by applying HD and Chi-square divergence. In the case of HD
with the dynamic threshold, we get (as shown in Fig. 7) 4 false
alarms, with 100% of detection accuracy. In contrast, for the
case of χ2 Divergence, we get 1 false alarm (see Fig. 8), and
spike intensity is proportional to the intensity of the attack.
We found through our conducted experiments that Chi-square
divergence performs better than HD in terms of reducing false
alarm, with less effort for tuning the dynamic threshold. The
intensity of raised spikes in Chi-square increases with the
intensity of attacks and dynamic threshold becomes useless.
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we analyzed the accuracy of 2 divergence
measures (HD & Chi-square divergence) over Sketch data
structure, for network anomaly detection. We compared their
performances in terms of true positive and false alarm ratio,
over real IP traces collected from backbone networks with in-
jected real distributed SYN flooding attacks at known instants.
Afterward, we used dynamic threshold for achieving the best
trade off between false alarm and true detection. We found that
HD achieves a good detection, but with higher false alarm ratio
than Chi-square divergence. Furthermore, the intensity of trig-
gered spikes by Chi-square divergence increases significantly
with the intensity of attacks, and tuning the parameters of
dynamic threshold is not required for anomaly detection. It is
important to note that these divergence measures with Sketch
are computationally efficient for handling traffic on high speed
networks.
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